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Abstract:  Wisconsin’s 600,000 deer hunters will bear the brunt of the economic 
losses from chronic wasting disease (CWD) in the Wisconsin deer herd.  Though 
studies have not been done to pinpoint these losses, under plausible assumptions, 
they could have amounted to between $58 million and $83 million in 2002.  I 
would anticipate somewhat smaller losses in 2003, perhaps between $30 million 
and $53 million.  CWD can also be expected to cause deer hunters to spend less 
on their sport than they have in the past.  However, the impacts of reduced hunter 
spending on the Wisconsin economy should not be too large.  Losses to the deer 
hunting economy will be counterbalanced as resident hunters who reduce 
expenditures spend their money elsewhere in the economy.  Some spending by 
nonresident hunters will be lost, but deer hunting is a very small part of the tourist 
economy.  Nevertheless, businesses that serve hunters are likely to feel the effects 
and this is especially true in rural areas as fewer urban deer hunters spend money 
on the services they provide.  Additional costs are being borne by public agencies 
in Wisconsin as they try to cope with the disease.  Little is known about impacts 
on deer and elk farms, on those who feed deer to facilitate viewing, and on feed 
businesses that cater to deer feeders. 
 
Large numbers of Wisconsin residents first became aware of CWD following its 
discovery in the south-central part of the state in early 2002.  The Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR) implemented programs to try to eradicate deer in the area 
where the disease was discovered, drastically reduce the herd in adjacent areas, and test 
deer harvested throughout the state during the 2002 hunting season.  Plans designed to 
eradicate the disease through increased hunting in the fall and winter of 2003-04 and 
other strategies are now in place.  Regulations affecting Wisconsin’s more than 900 deer 
and elk farms have been strengthened.  Feeding deer to facilitate hunting and viewing 
was banned in 2002 and will be limited in 2003. 
 
  Obviously, CWD has an economic side to it.  Businesses that cater to Wisconsin’s 
more than 600,000 deer hunters, such as sporting goods stores, will be adversely affected 
if hunters drop out or reduce their level of activity in response to the disease.  Rural 
businesses that serve resident and nonresident hunters are particularly vulnerable, since 
hunting trips can transfer dollars from urban to rural areas where economic opportunities 
are often limited.  Adverse publicity about CWD and regulation of deer farms may 
adversely affect their profitability in a number of ways.  Public agencies that regulate hunting and deer and elk farming have had to absorb substantial costs in order to address 
CWD.  In what follows, I will treat these effects under the heading of market and agency 
impacts. 
 
  But accounting for market and agency impacts alone would be far from the whole 
story.  In fact, I will argue that the brunt of the economic losses associated with CWD in 
Wisconsin will not fall on businesses, but on the deer hunters themselves.  Since deer 
hunting opportunities are supplied by the state rather than through the market, these 
effects will be termed nonmarket impacts.
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  The goal of this paper is to consider, within the limitations of current knowledge, 
the potential economic effects of CWD in Wisconsin in 2002, the first year of hunting 
after the disease was discovered, and in the upcoming 2003 season.  There is much that is 
not known about CWD.  This holds at least as much for economics as for other aspects of 
the problem.  I am aware of no economic studies in Wisconsin or elsewhere that have 
gathered data that is tailor made for assessing the impacts of CWD.  Hence, the analysis 
to be presented here is more speculative than definitive.  Still, using theory, common 
sense, and available data, I have been able to piece together enough information to 
predict who in Wisconsin will be affected and to assess the potential magnitudes of the 
hunting-related impacts in broad terms. 
 
I begin by asking a question that lies at the center of any effort to judge the 
potential economic effects of CWD: how will hunters react?  The more hunters who 
decide not to hunt or are adversely affected in other ways, the larger are both the market 
and nonmarket impacts, as discussed in later sections. 
 
  Before getting into the issues further it is worth pausing to stress that CWD 
impacts are shrouded in uncertainty.  Right now, public health officials such as the World 
Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control have concluded there is no 
known link between CWD and human illness.  The State of Wisconsin is treating CWD 
as a wildlife health problem, and not one of human health, but officials are quick to point 
out that they cannot be absolutely certain that it is safe to eat venison from an infected 
animal.  There can be little doubt that public attention to the problem is driven to a large 
degree by fears of adverse human health effects like those that attended mad cow disease.  
Nor is there any evidence that CWD affects animals other than deer and elk, but 
additional economic impacts would occur if the disease “jumps” to cattle or other 
animals.  Bad news relating to human health or the health of domestic animals could 
greatly increase the adverse economic effects beyond those discussed below.  
 
One source of uncertainty has been much reduced recently.  Throughout 2002, 
many worried that CWD was present elsewhere in Wisconsin.  Those with human health 
concerns feared that they might inadvertently eat venison from an infected animal even 
though it was taken far from the south central part of the state.  Deer from throughout the 
state were sampled during 2002 hunting season and tested.  This showed with 
considerable statistical rigor that occurrence of CWD in wild deer is limited to all or part 
of only six contiguous counties in south-central Wisconsin.
3  This is likely to be treated as good news by hunters in other parts of the state and should lessen the economic effects 
of CWD so long as the disease does not spread over larger parts of Wisconsin. 
Judging the Decline In Deer Hunting Participation 
 
So, the analysis that follows must rest on predictions and assumptions about how 
Wisconsin hunters are reacting to CWD.  In particular, how many (if any) will reduce 
their participation in deer hunting or stop hunting all together?  As the news about 
various aspects of the disease accumulated in 2002, there was much speculation about the 
effects it would have on participation in the fall hunting season.  This was an important 
question not only because of potential economic impacts, but also because the DNR’s 
strategy of deer eradication and reduction depends on hunting. 
 
In the spring of 2002, the press reported an unpublished St. Norbert College 
survey of deer hunters across the state.  It asked, among other things, “Would you 
consider not hunting deer in Wisconsin because of CWD?”  36% of those surveyed said 
yes.  The University of Wisconsin Survey Center conducted a poll between June 8 and 
June 17, 2002.  (So far as I know it was never published.)  It found that 75% of the 
hunters surveyed had not changed their hunting plans for fall as a result of CWD.  By 
implication, the other 25% were at least considering a change.  Given the way that deer 
hunting is deeply entrenched in Wisconsin life and traditions, in the late summer of 2002, 
I guessed that decreased deer hunters and deer-hunting days would be somewhat less, at 
between 10 and 20 percent.
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Some information that has come to light since that time would tend to support my 
guess.  After years of relative stability,
5 gun deer license sales declined from 688,540 
licenses in 2001 to 618,945 in 2002, a decline of 75,767 licenses or 10 percent in one 
year.  Archery license sales fell even more precipitously, with a 19 percent decline 
between 2001 and 2002.  Combining gun and archery licenses, the decline was right at 12 
percent.
6  The annual deer harvest in Wisconsin is less stable than license sales, but there 
would appear to have been a large decline there as well. The total statewide harvest in 
2002 was 372,021 deer.
7  This is 16 percent less than in 2001, 40 percent less than in 
2000 (a record year), and 20 percent less than the average over the five years, 1997-2001. 
  
On the other hand, results from a study by Jordan Petchenik of the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources following the 2002 hunting season would indicate that 
the effect might not have been so severe.
8  In early 2003, Petchenik surveyed gun deer 
license holders from 2001 about their behavior during the 2002 season and their attitudes 
and beliefs regarding CWD.  About 12 percent of the respondents from outside the CWD 
counties did not hunt in 2002, but only 32 percent of those who did not hunt gave CWD 
as the reason.  This would imply a decline in participation due to CWD of slightly more 
than 4 percent (32 percent of 12 percent).  Many reasons other than CWD were given for 
not hunting, including scheduling conflicts, age, and health. 
 
The license sales data and survey data are hard to reconcile, but the license sales 
data seem more solid.  The main question that arises is whether or not the license sales decline was attributable to CWD.  However, given the relative stability of license sales 
over the previous decade, CWD seems to be the most probable cause of the decline.  
Hence, in what follows, I will assume a 12 percent decline in deer hunters in 2002 
compared to 2001. 
 
What can we expect in 2003?  As noted, the testing done after the 2002 season 
brought the good news that apparently the disease is restricted to parts of only six 
contiguous counties.  I would expect this to moderate the tendency of hunters to drop out, 
but of course how much is speculative.  To explore the possible magnitudes of the 
impacts, I will assume a 6 to 10 percent decline in hunter numbers in 2003 relative to the 
2001 baseline.  
Market and Agency Impacts 
  As a point of departure, let’s draw on the 2001 National Survey of Fishing, 
Hunting, and Wildlife-Related Recreation, published by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service.
9  This is a nationwide survey that is done roughly every five years with samples 
large enough to make estimates about participation and expenditures by hunters, anglers, 
and other wildlife enthusiasts at the state level.   The Fish and Wildlife Service estimated 
based on this survey that about 596,000 people hunted deer in Wisconsin in 2001.
10 They 
estimated that Wisconsin deer hunting was responsible for 7,052,000 hunter-days, a 
figure I will use later on. 
 
According to this same source, Wisconsin hunters spent an estimated 
$298,919,000 on travel and equipment for big game hunting in 2001.  Since 94% of all 
big game hunting-days were spent hunting deer (bear and turkey are also considered big 
game in the survey), I will assume that about 94% of the dollars spent or about 
$281million were spent on deer hunting.  This covers only equipment and travel and deer 
hunters spent money on other things as well.  Other hunting costs are mostly made up of 
magazine subscriptions, membership dues and contributions, land leasing and ownership, 
licenses, stamps, tags, and permits.  These costs are only reported for all hunting.  Deer 
hunting is not separated out.  For all Wisconsin hunting (including deer, small game, 
migratory birds, etc.) spending for items other than travel and hunting equipment 
amounted to an estimated $373 million in 2001.  Since deer-hunting days amounted to 73 
per cent of all hunting-days, I will assume that 73 percent of all hunting spending other 
than for equipment and travel was for deer hunting.  That would be about $272 million.  
Hence the total spending in 2001 on deer hunting in Wisconsin for travel, hunting 
equipment, and other hunting costs is estimated to be $553 million ($281 million plus 
$272 million) or about $928 per deer hunter. 
 
To estimate the impacts of CWD on deer hunting in 2002, I will assume that in 
the absence of CWD, hunter expenditures would have been the same in 2002 as they 
were 2001.  I will also assume that the decline in deer hunters of 12 percent, as estimated 
in the preceding section, would translate to a 12 percent decline in deer hunting 
expenditures.  This would imply a reduction in hunter expenditures in 2002 of 12 percent 
of $553 million or about $66 million.  If my assumed decline in hunters of 6 to 10 percent relative to the 2001 baseline holds, then the 2003 impact on expenditures will decline to 
between $33 million to $55 million.   
 
These figures, of course, constitute a lot of money.  Businesses that cater to deer 
hunters are suffering substantial losses of revenues.  As these losses trickle down to the 
household level, incomes of some Wisconsin households would be expected to decline by 
several tens of millions of dollars.  Furthermore, some rural households depend on 
businesses like motels, eating and drinking establishments, deer processing facilities, 
food and beverage stores and gas stations where hunters from urban areas spend money 
locally. When fewer hunters come, these households will see their incomes fall and many 
of the affected individuals live in areas where economic opportunities are limited.  
Unfortunately, data are not available to estimate the share of market losses that will fall 
on rural areas.  
 
   So CWD’s effects were felt in the Wisconsin economy last fall and similar, 
though probably somewhat reduced, impacts will be felt in 2003.  At the same time, it is 
important not to make too big a deal out of these market losses.  Consider: 
 
•  In the context of Wisconsin’s economy taken as a whole, this is not very much 
money.  In both 2002 and 2003, it is less than $15 per Wisconsin citizen per 
year.
11   
 
•  It is true that tourism is a significant part of the Wisconsin economy.  It is also 
likely that nonresident deer hunting was particularly hard hit by news of CWD in 
Wisconsin.  While, as we have seen, deer hunting license sales overall were down 
12 percent in 2002, compared to 2001, nonresident deer license sales were down 
more than 19 percent.  But deer hunting is a very small part of the tourist 
economy.  Less than 6 percent of deer hunters are nonresidents.  Hence losses 
from a decline in out-of-state tourism in 2002 would amount to only $5 million to 
$10 million in lost tourism revenues and the impact should be less in 2003.
12  
Wisconsin’s revenues from tourism are measured in billions of dollars.
13   
 
•  Since nonresident hunting is a small share, most of the lost deer hunter spending 
will be associated with resident deer hunters.  This will certainly hurt some 
businesses and households, as I have already mentioned, but these dollars will not 
evaporate.  Residents who hunt deer less or not at all will spend the money 
elsewhere, probably largely within the state.  This will benefit businesses and 
households elsewhere in the Wisconsin economy.  Gains and losses are likely to 
be more or less equal as these dollars flow into other sectors.   
 
Hence, I would conclude that the net loss to Wisconsin’s economy as a whole, which is 
due only to reduced spending by nonresident deer hunters, was likely in the $5 million to 
$10 million range for 2002 and will be less in 2003.  Someone will feel these losses, but 
in the overall Wisconsin economy, this is quite small.  Losses from reduced resident deer 
hunting will likely be counterbalanced by gains elsewhere in Wisconsin’s economy. 
   Of course, reduced license sales mean reduced revenues going into the coffers of 
the DNR.  I have not made separate estimate of these losses since expenditures on 
licenses are already included in the figures just presented.  It is nevertheless well worth 
mentioning that the State of Wisconsin spent about $14.7 million in the last fiscal year to 
combat CWD.
14  About $12.6 million was spent by the DNR, partly from the license fees 
and partly from a special appropriation from the Legislature.  The rest was spent by other 
state agencies.  Less extensive testing is planned in 2003, so these costs may decline 
somewhat.   
 
  There are two other market aspects that I cannot even begin to quantify at this 
time.  First, deer and elk farming has become a significant form of alternative agriculture 
in Wisconsin.  Meat, hides, velvet from antlers, live animals, and private hunting 
opportunities enter the market from several hundred deer and elk farms.  CWD has 
affected this industry in several ways.  Markets have been hurt as restrictions on 
international trade in velvet and interstate trade in live animals have been enacted.  Costs 
for record keeping, testing of animals, extra fencing, and other items must be absorbed.  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the venison market has been hurt.  Profitability has no 
doubt suffered for all these reasons.  Some costs are also being borne by the Wisconsin 
Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection, which regulates deer and 
elk farms. Second, feed dealers have historically provided various items used by residents 
of the state who want to attract deer for viewing or hunting.  A ban on feeding wild deer 
was enacted in 2002 as a CWD prevention measure, hurting the market of these feed 
dealers.  For 2003-04, feeding is banned in 22 “high-risk” Wisconsin counties.  Data are 
not available to quantity the market effects of these bans. 
Nonmarket Impacts 
 
To account for the full economic effects of CWD, natural resource economists 
would argue that we should look beyond losses in hunter expenditures, agency costs, and 
lost profits of deer and elk farmers and feed dealers.  Deer hunting is important to 
Wisconsin’s citizens and the concern that venison may be tainted reduces the value of the 
sport to deer hunters.  The question is, how much? 
 
To begin to consider the economic value of deer hunting, let’s start with what we 
might think of as the “price” of the hunt.  If you are a resident of Wisconsin, you can buy 
a gun deer license for $20.  That could be considered the “price” of a season of deer 
hunting.  But deer hunting is worth more than that.  In the preceding section, it was 
estimated in 2001, deer hunters spent more than $900 each on average to participate in 
the sport.  In a sense, the “price” of a season of deer hunting is about $900.  But $900 per 
hunter per year is the cost of deer hunting, not its value.  Deer hunters on average must 
place a value of at least $900 each on a season of deer hunting.  Otherwise they would 
not continue to spend that kind of money to do it.  Economists reason that most of them 
must have a value greater than the $900 they spend.  If they got only $900 worth of 
pleasure per year out of deer hunting, they would just break even.  Economists call this 
extra value their “consumer surplus” or simply “surplus value.”  Surplus value is the 
maximum amount they would be willing to pay for the hunting opportunity over and above what it costs them.  This is a long-standing and widely accepted principle of 
resource economics. 
 
Unfortunately, there is not study of the surplus value for deer hunting in 
Wisconsin that would be appropriate for this analysis.  I propose to use a value of $40 per 
hunter per day in order to explore the potential loss to deer hunting from CWD.  This is 
roughly in keeping with a survey of available studies done between 1967 and 1998 on the 
value of outdoor recreation, including big game hunting, by Rosenberger and Loomis.
15  
For big game hunting, Rosenberger and Loomis found 35 studies containing 177 value 
estimates.  The mean value across these studies was $43.17 per hunting day (standard 
error of the mean, $2.21).  The median value was $37.30.  $40 per hunting day is also 




As noted already, the 2001 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-
Related Recreation estimated that in that year Wisconsin’s deer hunters recorded about 7 
million days of hunting.  At $40 per day, that would make the annual surplus value from 
deer hunting in the state $280 million under pre-CWD (2001) conditions. 
 
The onset of the disease and the measures implemented to try to control it are 
very likely to reduce this figure, imposing economic losses that are borne by Wisconsin 
deer hunters.  We can anticipate two kinds of losses.  First, one would expect a decrease 
in the total number of deer hunting days, as seems to have come to pass in 2002.  Second, 
for those who continue to hunt, the quality of the deer hunting experience seems likely to 
decline, with negative implications for the value per day.  For one thing, despite the lack 
of a proven link between CWD in deer and human illness, slightly more than a third of 
Petchenik’s respondents were “very” or “somewhat” concerned about the risk of 
becoming ill from CWD.  On another question, 36 percent of those living in CWD 
counties and 25 percent of those living in other counties reported that they would be 
concerned about eating venison from a deer that had not been tested for the disease.  Only 
about half found the information they had received from the DNR about human safety 
“believable.”
17  Such widespread concerns seem likely to detract from the enjoyment of 
the deer hunt and hence its value.  The apparent reduction in the deer harvest in 2002 is 
another sign of reduced quality.  Hunters evidently do not feel as free as they did 
previously to harvest deer.  Also, with so many hunters dropping out, social and family 
relationships surrounding the hunt are likely being disrupted, further reducing quality. 
 
Let us assume that the 12 percent decline in deer hunters for 2002 resulted in a 12 
percent decline in deer hunting days in that year.
18  That would be 840,000 days.  At $40 
per day, the lost days would be worth $34 million (rounding to the nearest million 
dollars).  If the value of the remaining 6.2 million hunting days went down 10 percent to 
20 percent (to between $32 and $36) then the value of the loss in quality of hunting 
would amount to between $25 million and $49 million.  Combining these figures would 
imply that a loss in value to deer hunters of between $58 million and $83 million in 2002. 
 For the same reasons as earlier stated, I would anticipate lower losses in 2003.  
Assuming that hunting days will be down 6 percent to 10 percent and that the value of 
remaining days drops by 5 to 10 percent would mean losses between $30 million and $53 
million in 2003. 
 
Data are not available to even speculate on the potential nonmarket impact on 
deer viewers.  According to the 2001 National Survey, wildlife watching is very 
widespread in Wisconsin.  Over 2.4 million people participated in 2001.  Over 1.8 million 
fed wildlife.  Close to a million reported viewing large mammals and in Wisconsin most 
of them must be referring to deer.  But how will deer viewers fare under CWD?  Perhaps 
the most dramatic impacts during 2002 and 2003 are related to bans on feeding.  It is well 
known that many people feed deer to attract them for viewing, but there is no basis to 
judge the magnitude of the impacts from feeding bans.  Eradication and herd reduction 
will have additional, difficult-to-judge impacts. 
Conclusions 
  On the market and agency side, the largest costs identified here fall on the public 
sector as it struggles to deal with the problem.  This could easily amount to $15 million in 
2002 ($12 million for the DNR and maybe $3 million for other agencies).  Agency costs 
may be less in 2003.  In the private sector, some losses, amounting to a few million 
dollars, are being incurred due to reduced tourist revenues from nonresident deer hunters.   
To be sure, there will be other losses in the private sector.  Some of the businesses that 
cater to hunters may feel substantial impacts from reduced hunting.  Sporting goods 
dealers as well as rural businesses that would otherwise enjoy a larger influx of new 
dollars from urban hunters may be especially vulnerable.  But there will be 
counterbalancing “winners” for the most part as state residents who spend less on deer 
hunting spend more in-state on other things.  And this leaves losses to deer and elk farms 
and to feed dealers unaccounted for. 
 
  The nonmarket losses seem likely to be much larger.  Under plausible 
assumptions, they could amount to several tens of millions of dollars in both 2002 and 
2003.  While recognizing that these losses are important, it is also important to keep them 
in perspective.  On average, they may amount to less than $140 per deer hunter in 2002, 
and 2003 will hopefully see the losses subside somewhat.  Such losses are significant, but 
they are not the end of the world.  There is still a lot of deer hunting in Wisconsin and it 
is generating a lot of surplus value for the hunters. 
 
  The future is, of course, uncertain.  If the disease can be eliminated or contained 
in a relatively small part of the state or inexpensive, reliable tests for the disease can be 
devised so that hunters can be confident that the venison they and others in their 
households eat is not from infected animals, then the damages, both market and 
nonmarket, will remain at moderate to low levels.  If the area where CWD is endemic 
expands over time as it has in states like Colorado, the losses will grow.  If eating venison 
from CWD-infected deer is linked to positive, substantial risks to human health and the 
disease spreads out into the state, much larger losses, possibly in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars per year, could be sustained.  Large losses could also be sustained if CWD from deer begins to affect the health of domesticated animals.  Wise, well-thought-out, 
cost-effective public policies based in the best science available are definitely called for.   
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